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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
CLARICE DUPUIS,
Plaintif f-A~pellant
and Cross-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 16865

EDWIN CYRILL NIELSON,
Defendant-Respondent
and Cross-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
APPEAL FROM VERDICT AND JUDGMENT
OF THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, HONORABLE
ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JR., JUDGE

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This is a personal injury case arising from a
rear-end collision involving vehicles driven by appellant
and respondent.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury on November 29 and
20, 1979.

At the close of evidence, appellant was granted

a directed verdict by the court as to respondent's liability.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant for
$1,000.00 in general damages, $686.73 in special medical
damages and $100.00 for loss of earnings.

Subsequent to
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trial, appellant made a motion for additur or new trial,
claiming that the damage verdict was inadequate.
motion was denied by the trial court.

Said

Further, respondent

made a motion for set-off as to reimbursement paid to
appellant's insurer for no-fault benefits received by
appellant prior to trial.

The court granted said motion

for set-off as to medical and loss of earnings payments
and denied the same as to a set-off against the general
damages award for loss of services reimbursement.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order denying appellant's
appeal, affirming the damages verdict of the jury and
awarding to respondent a set-off against the general damages verdict for reiwbursenent paid to appellant's insurer
for household services payments.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The issue of liability was sufficiently clear to
the court that the court directed a verdict in favor of the
appellant and against the respondent at the conclusion of
the evidence.
Respondent asserts that appellant's statement of
facts concerning testimony as to appellant's alleged
injuries, course of medical treatment and alleged expenses
both medicals and lost wag.es, is misleading in that the
appellant makes reference to medical treatment by Dr.
Isaacson, Dr. Jean Wayman, chiropractor, medical testimony
-2-
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by Dr. Thomas Soderberg and physical therapy by Larry Brown,
R.P.T.

Also appellant has made reference to statements

made by various doctors and other persons giving medical
treatment.

Appellant has referred to the

treat~ent

given

and doctors who have allegedly treated the appellant, when
at the time of trial appellant failed to produce the
chiropractor, Dr. Jean Wayman, the physical therapist,
Larry Brown or Dr. Isaacson and produced only Dr. Thomas
Soderberg.

Dr. Soderberg first saw the appellant eight

months after the accident and saw her only twice on August 9,
1978 and again on August 23, 1978.

Appellant was then not

seen again by Dr. Soderberg for over a year, until the 22nd
day of September, 1979.
Appellant produced no testiwDny from a doctor
indicating that the appellant could not work because of
injuries sustained as a result of the accident.

The only

testimony to this fact was the testimony of the appellant.
Appellant further testified that during this period of time
she was having emotional problems arising from a divorce,
that she had remarried and that her husband had had a heart
attack, requiring her to leave the area.
The evidence, primarily the medical records of
Dr. Soderberg, illustrate the personal problems not related
to the accident which the appellant had.

Said problems are

pointed out in the medical records of Dr. Soderberg dated
November 7, 1979.

It is stated therein that the appellant was
-3-
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having tension because her husband had disappeared and had
not been found for a week.
The testimony at the time of trial further showed
that the appellant was being treated simultaneously by the
chiropractor, Dr. Jean Wayman, and by Dr. Soderberg.

Dr.

Soderberg was not aware that the appellant was receiving
chiropractic treatments at the same time that she was receiving physical therapy treatments at the request of Dr.
Soderberg.

On some occasions the appellant received physical

thereapy and chiropratic treatments on the same day or within
a day or so of each other.
The jury returned a verdict for general damages
consistent with the testimony of the appellant and Dr. Thomas
Soderberg.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
NEITHER ADDITUR NOR NEW TRIAL IS
APPROPRIATE IN APPELLANT'S CASE
Respondent does not challenge the assertion by
appellant that this court, in appropriate circumstances,
may order additur contingent upon acceptance by a defendant
or, alternatively, the granting of a new trial.

Such was

the order of the Supreme Court of Utah in Bodon v. Suhrmann,
8 Utah 2d. 35, 327 P.2d 826 (1958), relied upon by the
appellant.
However, the circumstances warranting additur are
narrowly drawn.

Additur or a new trial is proper only when
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the damage award is inadequate due to having been arrived
at by the jury under influence of passion or prejudice or
when the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict or
the verdict is against the law.
No claim is made by appellant, nor could one be
sustained, that the verdict herein was inadequate because
the jury acted under the influence of passion or prejudice.
Nor was the verdict against prevailing law.
The only basis for challenging the damages award
herein is that the evidence is insufficient to support the
verdict, or, to more clearly state the proposition proffered
by appellant, that the verdict is inadequate in light of the
evidence presented as to damages.
Consequently, this court is asked to consider
the weight to be accorded the verdict of a jury which was
fully apprised of the evidence as to damages sustained by
the appellant and which was arrived at on the basis of proper
instructions.
In the case of Jensen v. Eakins, 575 P.2d 179
(1978), plaintiff appealed from a jury verdict, claiming the
damage award was inadequate.

The Utah Supreme Court, in

affirming the amount of the award stated:
"The award of damages may be
less than the plaintiff wished or
even less than we would have found
had we been the jury; but it is the
prerogative of the jury to make the
determination of damages and we
cannot substitute our judgment for
that of the fact finder unless the
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evidence compels a finding that
reasonable men and women would,
of necessity, come to a different
conclusion."
575 P.2d at 180
Similarly, in the case of Schneider v. Suhrmann,
8 Utah 2d 35, 327 P.2d 822,

(1958), a companion case to

Bodon v. Suhrmann, supra, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
"Cases dealing with the revie·w
of damages found by a jury, with
invariable consistency, recite the
reluctance of courts to interfere
with such verdicts if there is any
reasonable basis in the evidence upon which they can be sustained.
This is based partly upon the often
referred to advantages the fact
trier has in being in immediate
contact with the trial, the parties
and the witnesses.
In addition
thereto, the question of damages for
personal injuries involving the intangibles of pain and suffering,
with respect to which reasonable
minds are apt to differ greatly, are
matters which a jury is peculiarly
adapted to determine.
327 P.2d at
825
The court in Schneider then affirmed the jury
verdict awarding the plaintiff $2,000.00 general damages as
a result of contracting trichinosis fron sausage sold by
the defendant.
The law does not contemplate upsetting a jury
verdict merely because the plaintiff's expectation as to
the a9propriate award of damages is not fulfilled.

The

jury is and should be entitled to give whatever weight it
chooses to the plaintiff's evidence as to the extent of
injury and reasonableness of the claiMs concerning medical
treatment and loss of earnings.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The jury verdict in the instant case may be
set aside only if this court concludes that reasonable
minds would, of necessity, have differed from the jury in
this case in their conclusion as to the proper anount of
damages to be awarded.
Respondent asserts that the verdict awarding
appellant $1,000.00 general damages,

$686~73

in medicals

and $100.00 loss of earnings is well within the range of
reasonableness.
tion that

Appellant is not entitled to any presump-

the jury accept appellant's evidence as to

damages nor as to the credibility of appellant's witnesses.
In fact, the only direct medical evidence produced by
appellant was the testimony of Dr. Soderberg who first
treated appellant some eight months after the accident.

The

balance of appellant's evidence as to medical treatment,
medical expenses and lost wages was in the form of selfserving declarations by appellant and hearsay statements
of physicians and physical therapists.
Respondent urges the court to deny appellant's
request for additur or in the alternative, for a new trial.
POINT II
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO A SET-OFF
FOR HOUSEHOLD SERVICES PAYMENTS PAID
TO APPELLANT
Section 31-41-11 (a), Utah Coce Annotated (1953),
requires that a defendant's insurer reimburse a plaintiff's
insurer for any no-fault benefits paid to plaintiff pursuant
-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act.

Further,

subsection (b) of the same statute provides for binding
arbitration between insurers to settle the amount of such
reimbursement.
In the case before the court, respondent's insurer
prior to trial ?aid to appellant's insurer the

SQm

of

$494.09 as medical expenses, $1,200.00 for loss of earnings
and $708.00 for loss of household services.

Those sums

represented the amounts paid by. appellant's insurer as nofault benefits and were accepted as reimbursement of same
by said insurer.

The jury verdict herein awarded the

plaintiff the sum of $1,000.00 in general damages, $686.73
as special damages for medical expenses and the sum of
$100.00 as special damages for loss of earnings._

The trial

court, at respondent's request, awarded a set-off for the
medical payments reimbursement and loss of earnings reinbursement, leaving a balance due appellant of $192.64 for special
medical damages.

The court refused to award respondent a set-

off against the general damages verdict for the $708.00
reimbursement paid by respondent's insurer to appellant's
insurer for no-fault household services payments to
appellant.
Respondent contends that the language of Section
31-41-11, Utah Code Annotated (1953), mandates a set-off
aoainst aooellant's verdict for all amounts paid by
~

--

respondent's insurer as reimbursement of personal injury
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protection benefits paid to appellant, includins the household services payments.
The clear intent of the Utah No-Fault Act is to
provide for reimbursement of losses, but not to allow a
double recovery for those losses by a plaintiff who accepts
no-fault benefits and attempts to ciaim in addition thereto
any corresponding sums awarded by jury verdict.
The Utah Supreme Court dealt with the effect of
the Utah No-Fault Act in connection with claims for no-fault
benefits in the case of Jones v. TransaRerica Insurance
Com?any, 592 P.2d 609

(1979).

In that case, plaintiff was

paid by his insurer the sum of $365.63 in medical expenses
and $567.89 in disability benefits.

Some eighteen months

later, plaintiff submitted additional claims for payment
for loss of services of $4,380.00 and for loss of earnings
of $2,485.36.

Defendant Transamerica Insurance Company

refused to pay those claims and, in the meantime, plaintiff
settled with the tortfeasor for the sum of $6,000.00.
Plaintiff then brought suit against Transamerica Insurance
Company for the subsequent amounts claimed for loss of
services and earnings.

The Utah Supreme Court, in affirm-

ing the summary judgment of the trial court denying
plaintiff's claims for additional payment stated that the
no-fault act was designed to eliminate small injury claims
by providing automatic payment and further:
"No-fault benefits are also available to those who sustain greater
-9-
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injuries.
This is so even though
they remain free to pursue a tort
claim as well.
However, this does
not entitle one to a double recovery
for a single loss since the statute
specifically affords subrogation
rights and arbitration between the
insurers whenever no-fault benefits
are paid.
"A fortiori, the legislative intent
specifically expressed in the Act itself to 'possible stablize, if not
effectuate certain savings in, the
rising costs of automobile accident
insurance and to effectuate a more
efficient, ·equitable method of handling the greater bulk of the personal
injury claims that arise out of automobile accidents' negatives the
contention that double recovery is
permitted.
Double recovery for a
single item of loss was never contemplated by the legislature and we will
not permit any type of automatic re\•lard
or 'windfall' to an injured plaintiff.
592 P.2d at 611.
Under the rationale of Jones, supra, defendant
is entitled to a set-off against the jury verdict for the
$708.00 paid as reimbursement for loss of household services
as '•Jell as for the medical expense and loss of earnings
payments.
Further, the holding of this court in Allstate
v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (1980), that a tort-victim's recovery
from the liability insurer cannot be reduced by the amount
of no-fault benefits paid has no application in the instant
case, inasmuch as, prior to trial herein, appellant's insurer
received full reimbursement for household services payments
made to appellant and appellant presented evidence at trial
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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as to loss of household services, seeking to recover for the
same.

In Ivie, supra, the court found that an injured party

should plead only for those damages for which he has received
no reparation under his no-fault insurance.
By virtue of the decisions in Jones, supra, and
Ivie, supra, the no-fault act prohibits double recovery of
any amounts payable under the act, including loss o.f household services.

Since the only source available in this

case for setting off the loss of services payments is the
general damages award, respondent is entitled to a credit
against that award in the sum of $708.00, representing the
amount paid by respondent's insurer to appellant's insurer.
Appellant should be barred from recovering any sum
from respondent which is duplicative of payments accepted by
appellant's insurer as reimbursement for no-fault benefits .
DATED this

/

.?

·>,

6

day of June, 19 80.

)"":

FRANK N.

I

'
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KARRl\.S

Attorney for Respondent
321 South Sixth East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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I hereby certify that I mailed two (2) copies
of the foregoing Respondent's Brief to James E. Hawkes,
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant, 301 Bump & Ayers Building,
2120 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106, this
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of June, 1980.
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